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INTRODUCTION
Nationwide judicial power is a strong tool with far-reaching
consequences. It is clear that the United States Supreme Court, as the
highest court in the land, can exercise its power nationwide. But what
about when a single federal district court judge makes a ruling that
applies to the entire country? Instinctively, and described in these
terms, this feels suspicious. Nationwide power is a strong authority for
one judge to wield, as opposed to a panel of three judges or nine
justices. This power is magnified when a nationwide scope is applied
to preliminary injunctions. A preliminary injunction is an
“extraordinary” remedy,1 and the type of relief it provides is “drastic
medicine.”2 The practical effect of a nationwide preliminary
injunction is that a single, unelected federal district court judge makes
a ruling that applies to the entire nation prior to a full trial on the
merits. Using a nationwide scope with an already remarkable form of

* © 2017 Katherine B. Wheeler.
1. Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008). But see Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[D]istrict courts enjoy broad
discretion in awarding injunctive relief.”).
2. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984).
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relief creates a one-two punch of extraordinary and far-reaching
judicial power.
Despite the extreme nature of this remedy, there have been five
different instances of various federal district court judges in Texas
granting a nationwide preliminary injunction in the past two years.3
This practice, however, is not unique to Texas. After the election of
President Trump and his issuance of several controversial executive
orders, district court judges granted nationwide preliminary
injunctions in Washington,4 Maryland,5 Hawaii,6 California,7 and
Illinois.8 Each of these preliminary injunctions has enjoined the
federal government from implementing a policy or regulation across
the entire country.9 This type of remedy is meant to be temporary, but
in the interim, it can have a substantial impact on people’s day-to-day
lives.10 For example, people in New York and Illinois had their
employment authorization revoked as a result of the Texas v. United
3. See generally Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d. 660 (N.D. Tex.
2016) (enjoining the Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing its rule
pursuant to the Affordable Care Act that prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender
identity or termination of pregnancy); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520
(E.D. Tex. 2016) (enjoining the Department of Labor from implementing and enforcing a
rule that increases the minimum salary level required for exemption from Fair Labor
Standards Act’s overtime requirements for executive, administrative, and professional
employees); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (enjoining the
Department of Education from enforcing its interpretation of “sex” to include gender
identity within the scope of Title VII and Title IX); Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No.
5:16-cv-00066, 2016 WL 3766121 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) (enjoining the Department of
Labor from implementing its new interpretation of the Advice Exemption Rule, which
requires an attorney to disclose confidential client communications related to a
unionization matter to the Department of Labor); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (enjoining the United States and Department of Homeland Security
from implementing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents program, which provides legal status to undocumented immigrants in the
United States), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
4. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 3, 2017), motion for stay pending appeal denied, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017),
appeal dismissed, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).
5. Int’l Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565 (D. Md.
2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, __
S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.), dismissed as moot, No. 17-1351 (4th
Cir. Nov. 20, 2017).
6. Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237–38 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, 859
F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), judgment vacated, __ S.Ct. __, 2017 WL 4782860 (Oct. 24, 2017)
(mem.).
7. City of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 508–09 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal
docketed, No. 17-16887 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2017).
8. City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __, 2017 WL
4081821, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017).
9. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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States (Texas I)11 preliminary injunction granted by a judge in the
Southern District of Texas.12 Moreover, the rationale for these
nationwide preliminary injunctions is often conclusory and
overbroad, and they rest on justifications used for permanent
injunctions, a similar yet distinct remedy.13 The use of nationwide
preliminary injunctions has not gone unnoticed by scholars,14 and it
will likely receive even more attention given the rapid pace at which
nationwide preliminary injunctions are being granted, the recent
litigation surrounding President Trump’s immigration executive
orders, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, and subsequent
dismissal as moot, in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance
Project,15 a case involving a nationwide preliminary injunction.16
There are a number of issues that arise when considering the
implementation of nationwide preliminary injunctions, including

11. 86. F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). In Texas I, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
United States and the Department of Homeland Security from enacting “Deferred Action
for Parents of American and Lawful Permanent Residents,” a program that would provide
legal status and various benefits for undocumented immigrants. Id. at 604.
12. Complaint, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2016)
(challenging the application of a preliminary injunction issued in the Southern District of
Texas to residents of Illinois, which caused the revocation of complainant’s employment
authorization); Amended Complaint, Make the Road N.Y. v. Baran, No. 1:16-cv-04756
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) (challenging the application of a preliminary injunction issued in
the Southern District of Texas to residents of New York, which caused the revocation of
complainant’s employment authorization).
13. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Constitution
vests the District Court with ‘the judicial Power of the United States.’ That power is not
limited to the district wherein the court sits but extends across the country.” (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1)), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.);
Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (“A nationwide
injunction is proper in this case. The Final Rule is applicable to all states. Consequently,
the scope of the alleged irreparable injury extends nationwide. A nationwide injunction
protects both employees and employers from being subject to different EAP exemptions
based on location. This Court is not alone in its decision.”) (citing Texas v. United States,
201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 835–36 (N.D. Tex. 2016); Nat’l Fed’n. Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016)); see also infra Part II.
14. See e.g, Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,
118 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions?
Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other
Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487–556 (2016); Zayn Siddique,
Nationwide Injunctions, 118 COLUMBIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Daniel J. Walker,
Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class Collective Relief, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1119–52 (2005).
15. __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017).
16. 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017).
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collateral estoppel,17 forum shopping,18 venue,19 and the doctrine of
allowing multiple lower courts to develop the law more robustly
within their respective circuits.20
This Comment explores the normative value of nationwide
preliminary injunctions granted by a federal district judge against the
federal government.21 Given the combination of the preliminary
nature and the broad scope of a nationwide remedy, there should be a
presumption against nationwide preliminary injunctions. When a
judge truly believes a nationwide scope is necessary, she should
implement procedural safeguards to protect against the concerns that
result from a determination prior to a hearing on the merits that
affects parties not before the court.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the purpose
and history of preliminary injunctions and the development of the
now-popular nationwide scope. Part II addresses the concerns of
granting nationwide preliminary injunctions. Section II.A
distinguishes between preliminary and permanent injunctions and
explains both why the distinction is crucial and why it is inappropriate
to rely on justifications for nationwide permanent injunctions when
implementing nationwide preliminary injunctions. Section II.B
discusses the concerns that arise with nationwide preliminary
injunctions that affect uninvolved nonparties and draws a parallel to
the concerns behind third-party standing. Part III discusses
recommendations that could address the concerns with nationwide
preliminary
injunctions
and
provides
input
on
which
recommendations would alleviate the concerns highlighted in this
Comment.

17. Walker, supra note 14, at 1134.
18. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 10–11).
19. Kate Huddleston, Nationwide Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F.
242, 244 (2017).
20. Michelle R. Slack, Separation of Powers and Second Opinions: Protecting the
Government’s Role in Developing the Law by Limiting Nationwide Class Actions Against
the Federal Government, 31 REV. LITIG. 943, 944–45 (2012).
21. This Comment focuses solely on cases in which the federal government is the
defendant. Even before President Trump’s administration, there was a political aspect to
the practice of granting nationwide preliminary injunctions when the defendant is the
federal government. It is not a coincidence that the lawsuits challenging actions made by
President Obama’s administration took place in Texas, and a similar pattern of injunctions
occurred in California during President Bush’s administration. Bray, supra note 14
(manuscript at at 9–10). The political implications of this practice are beyond the scope of
this Comment. For more discussion on the topic, see id. (manuscript at 9–12).
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PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND
NATIONWIDE SCOPE

To understand why there should be a presumption against
nationwide preliminary injunctions, it is useful to first review the
origins of preliminary injunctions and how they have evolved to exist
with a nationwide scope.
A. Preliminary Injunctions
A preliminary injunction is “[a] temporary injunction issued
before or during trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring
before the court has a chance to decide the case.”22 It is used to
prevent the plaintiffs from suffering harm while the litigation takes
place.23 Preliminary injunctions “merely . . . preserve the relative
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”24 The
extraordinary nature of a preliminary injunction stems from the
courts’ general reluctance to change the parties’ positions prior to the
plaintiff fully establishing his case.25 Because preliminary injunctions
are “a drastic and extraordinary remedy,” they should not be granted
routinely.26 However, federal district court judges have substantial
discretion in determining whether or not to grant a preliminary
injunction.27 Once the district court decides to grant a preliminary
injunction, appellate courts review the decision only for abuse of
discretion.28
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives federal
courts the power to grant preliminary injunctions.29 However, “[t]he
circumstances in which a preliminary injunction may be granted are
not prescribed by the Federal Rules.”30 Because Rule 65 does not

22. Preliminary Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
23. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2947 (3d ed. 2016).
24. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
25. Rachel A. Weisshaar, Note, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split
over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1022 (2012).
26. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010).
27. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1308 (4th Cir. 1992).
28. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 867 (2005). But see Henry J.
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 773–78 (1982) (“There need
be no concern that such a retraction of the [abuse of] discretion rule would lead to an
ossification of equity; the necessary leeway is built into the governing equitable principles
themselves.”).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
30. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 2947, at 114.

96 N.C. L. REV. 200 (2017)

2017]

NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

205

provide guidance on this issue, “[d]istrict judges still are guided by
traditional equity doctrines.”31
Federal courts derive their equity jurisdiction from the
Constitution and the Federal Judiciary Act.32 The Constitution vests
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States . . . in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish,”33 and “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity.”34 Congress established the rest of the
federal judiciary system through the Judiciary Act of 1789.35 The
Judiciary Act gives federal courts the jurisdiction over “all suits of a
civil nature . . . in equity.”36 The Supreme Court has
long held that “[t]he ‘jurisdiction’ thus conferred [in the
Judiciary Act] . . . is an authority to administer in equity suits
the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been
devised and was being administered by the English Court of
Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.”37
Therefore, principles from the English Court of Chancery guide the
determination of the propriety of federal courts’ equity power.
Equity developed in England as an alternative system to
common law when common law courts could not provide plaintiffs
with adequate relief.38 When a plaintiff wanted to be heard before a
court, he had to purchase a writ from the Chancellor, who acted on
behalf of the king.39 This writ was the plaintiff’s golden ticket to gain
access to the court, and once it was presented to the court, the court
would hear the case and decide whether to grant relief.40 At this time,
the types of cases heard by the court primarily involved property
rights and interests.41 As England’s economy evolved from
agricultural to commercial, new types of disputes and rights arose for
which no writs existed.42 This was problematic because the Provisions

31. Id. § 2942, at 38.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
34. Id. § 2.
35. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
36. Id.
37. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
(1999) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)).
38. Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform
Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 500 (2003).
39. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 3 (2d ed. 1956).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
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of Oxford of 1258 did not allow the Chancellor to create new writs
unless he had the consent of the king and his council.43 Therefore,
when a person sought to resolve a dispute for which no writ, and thus
no relief, existed, “it became common to resort to the king, through
the person of the Chancellor, for relief under the king’s prerogative of
grace, that arbitrary power of the king to do good and dispense
justice.”44 This practice resulted in the evolution of the Chancellor’s
role as a judicial officer and the creation of the Court of Chancery, as
well as and a system of equity that was distinct from the common
law.45 Although this evolution occurred gradually and slowly, “by the
15th century the chancellor was clearly a judge, recognized as such
and acting as such.”46
Subsequently, the English legal system operated as a dual system
of common law and equity.47 One of the main differences between a
common law court and the Court of Chancery was the manner in
which the Chancellor enforced judgments.48 Unlike a court of law, the
Chancellor could use the power of contempt to force the defendant to
act or refrain from acting in a certain way.49 Therefore, the Court of
Chancery could “prevent[] a threatened wrong or injury or proceed[]
to repair an injury” through a writ of injunction.50
When the English colonized America, they brought both systems
of common law and equity with them.51 Because of the inefficiencies
and cost of maintaining two court systems, most states merged “legal
and equitable powers in one court with provision for one form of civil
action.”52 Early courts were very hesitant to grant preliminary

43. Id.; see also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 29 (1973).
44. DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 4.
45. Id. at 4–5; DOBBS, supra note 43, at 31.
46. DOBBS, supra note 43, at 31.
47. Id. at 33.
48. See id. at 32.
49. Id.; see also DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 11. Given its in personam effect, an
injunction may be enforced outside of a court’s territorial jurisdiction. HENRY L.
MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 50 (1936). While this concept seems to support
broader injunctions (i.e., applying outside of the federal district in which it is granted), it
actually highlights a narrowing principle of preliminary injunctions—it applies to the
parties, not to others uninvolved in the lawsuit. Id. When viewed from the perspective of
the defendant, the federal government, the concept again seems to support nationwide
injunctions because the federal government acts throughout the entire nation. However, it
should be interpreted as applying to the defendant’s behavior with regard to the
plaintiff(s) specifically because the in personam effect of a preliminary injunction
highlights the importance of binding parties, not territories.
50. DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 15.
51. Id. at 6.
52. See id. at 7.
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injunctions, noting that this type of relief “should be granted with
great caution, and only when necessity requires.”53 Like judges in
England, American judges granted injunctions with a focus on
property rights.54
The first preliminary injunction case55 heard by the United States
Supreme Court was Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and
Woollen Co.56 in 1862. The dispute in Parker arose over the use of the
Winnipiseogee River in New Hampshire, and the appellant sought a
preliminary injunction against an alleged nuisance by the appellee.57
In considering whether to grant the preliminary injunction, the Court
noted that “[t]he case must be one of strong and imperious
necessity”58 and “[i]f the evidence be conflicting and injury doubtful,
this extraordinary remedy will be withheld.”59 The Court ultimately
denied the appellant’s request for a preliminary injunction because he
did not show that he was entitled to immediate equitable relief.60
With the exception of one other case,61 the Supreme Court did not
hear a case focused on preliminary injunctions again until the 1920s.
The three cases heard by the Court during this time period all focused
on the trial court’s discretion to grant preliminary injunctions.62
The Supreme Court dove further into its analysis of preliminary
injunctions in the 1940s. In Yakus v. United States,63 the Court
discussed the appropriateness of preliminary injunctions that enjoined
the implementation of price regulations during wartime.64 The Court
noted that when an injunction harms a public interest, “the court may
. . . withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the

53. Bronk v. Riley, 3 N.Y.S. 446, 447 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1888); see also Whiting Mfg.
Co. v. Joseph H. Bauland Co., 56 N.Y.S. 114, 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1898); Delaware, L &
W.R. Co. v. Cent. Stock-Yard & Transit Co., 12 A. 374, 375 (N.J. 1888).
54. See Walker, supra note 14, at 1129.
55. This determination is based on the Supreme Court cases that are in the Westlaw
Key section for “Preliminary, Temporary, and Interlocutory Injunctions in General,
k1071–k1120.”
56. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 545 (1862).
57. Id. at 546.
58. Id. at 552 (quoting Olmstead v. Loomis, 6 Barb. 152, 160 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 553.
61. This case, Buffington v. Harvey, briefly discusses the fact that “[t]he granting or
dissolution of a temporary injunction” is within the discretion of a trial court. 95 U.S. 99,
100 (1877).
62. See Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 230–31 (1929); Rice & Adams Corp.
v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 514 (1929); Meccano, Ltd. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141
(1920).
63. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
64. Id. at 441–42.
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parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the
plaintiff.”65 Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court heard several other cases involving preliminary
injunctions, but scope was never a primary issue.66
B.

Nationwide scope

Rule 65 also addresses the scope of preliminary injunctions,
albeit briefly. It describes the scope as binding “the parties; the
parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and other
persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone
described in [the aforementioned groups].”67 However, this is the
extent of guidance on the permissible scope of preliminary
injunctions,68 and the Federal Rules do not explicitly discuss the
authority of federal district courts to grant preliminary injunctions
that apply to the entire nation.69 Given this lack of guidance and the
drastic nature of preliminary injunctions, courts typically apply a
limiting principle to the scope of preliminary injunctions and advise
narrowly tailored injunctions with limited applicability.70 Allowing a
broad right to a preliminary injunction creates various concerns for a
court, such as “an institutional reluctance to undertake the
supervision of specific relief, a social bias against interference with
private ordering, and a fear of encouraging unscrupulous litigants to
institute unfounded actions.”71 As with the decision to grant a
preliminary injunction, district court judges use traditional equity
doctrines to guide their determination of the proper scope of
preliminary injunctions.72
Nationwide injunctions did not exist within the realm of
traditional equity because “there were no injunctions against the
65. Id. at 440.
66. See generally Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (questioning
whether a preliminary injunction should have been granted); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.
Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423 (1974) (discussing a conflict between state
law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Mo.-Kan.Tex. R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528 (1960) (raising jurisdictional issue); De Beers Consol. Mines v.
United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945) (raising jurisdictional issues).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
68. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 2955 (noting Rule 65(d) does not clearly
address the issue of overly broad injunctions).
69. CONG. RESEARCH SERV. LEGAL SIDEBAR, NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS: RECENT
RULINGS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT NATIONWIDE REACH OF A SINGLE FEDERAL
COURT (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/nationwide.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A97-T96D].
70. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 193 (2000);
Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984).
71. Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1056 (1965).
72. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 2942.
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Crown.”73 This is largely due to the structure of the Court of
Chancery (in that only one Chancellor existed) and the underlying
fact that the Chancellor was closely associated with the king.74
Nationwide preliminary injunctions are relatively new to the
American legal system. According to Samuel Bray, Wirtz v. Baldor
Electric Company,75 decided in 1963, appears to be the first instance
of a court granting a nationwide preliminary injunction.76 The issue in
Wirtz was whether the Secretary of Labor relied on improper
information when setting the minimum wages.77 The plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the Secretary’s determination through a preliminary
injunction, and the D.C. Circuit held that “if one or more of the
plaintiffs-appellees is or are found to have standing to sue, the
District Court should enjoin the effectiveness of the Secretary’s
determination with respect to the entire industry[,]” not just with
respect to the named plaintiffs.78
The issue of a nationwide preliminary injunction was raised again
a decade later in Harlem Valley Transportation Ass’n v. Stafford.79 In
Harlem Valley, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against
the Interstate Commerce Commission, its chairman, and the
Administrator of the EPA for alleged violations related to abandoned
rail lines under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.80 In
determining the scope of the injunction, District Court Judge Frankel
stated, in a footnote, that
[o]ne of the court’s main concerns during the hearing of the
motion for a preliminary injunction was the question whether
the plaintiffs, if they could prove entitlement to any relief, could
legitimately seek a restraint of nationwide effect when their
alleged interests might be of narrower geographic scope. Both
the United States and the ICC have now not only conceded, but
73. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 20); see also Samuel Bray, The Case Against
National Injunctions, No Matter Who is President, LAWFARE (Feb. 4, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/case-against-national-injunctions-no-matter-who-president
[http://perma.cc/U584-D5XW] (“[T]he national injunction has no basis in the tradition of
equity. For the first century and a half of the federal courts, there were no national
injunctions.”).
74. See Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 20–21, 39). For a fascinating discussion on
the impact of the shift from one chancellor in traditional English equity to multiplechancellor system in the United States, see id. (manuscript at 40–43).
75. 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
76. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 33).
77. Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 520.
78. Id. at 535.
79. 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974).
80. Id. at 1059–60.
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insisted, that a preliminary injunction in this case would “affect
the agency in the entire scope of its authority and
jurisdiction.”81
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
nationwide scope of the injunction,82 and in doing so, therefore “[t]he
court had backed into a national injunction without any real
consideration.”83 Since that time, courts have been willing to grant
nationwide preliminary injunctions enjoining the federal government
in a multitude of cases.84 For example, in In re EPA,85 the petitioners
challenged the “Clean Water Rule,” claiming that the United States
Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA changed the definition of
“waters of the United States” in a manner that would unlawfully
expand the agencies’ jurisdiction and upset the current federal-state
balance.86 The district court enjoined the Clean Water Rule
nationwide because the burden of following the new rule would be
felt nationwide.87 And over the past two years, federal district court
judges have been granting nationwide preliminary injunctions at an
alarmingly frequent rate.88
II. CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH NATIONWIDE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS
The concern with an order as drastic as a nationwide preliminary
injunction is twofold: first, the decision is made prior to a trial on the
merits, and second, the broad scope affects the interests of parties not
before the court. When a decision occurs after the full presentation of
information at a trial on the merits, a nationwide scope may perhaps
be appropriate. But when the standard to receive injunctive relief is
low, as it is with preliminary injunctions, a court should be more
cautious with the scope of its relief.89 Narrowing the scope alleviates
81. Id. at 1060 n.2.
82. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass’n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1974).
83. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 35).
84. See, e.g., In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 808–09 (6th Cir. 2015) (issuing a nationwide
stay, a remedy similar to an injunction); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677
(S.D. Tex. 2015); Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D. Cal. 2005),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 555 U.S.
488 (2009).
85. 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015).
86. Id. at 805–06.
87. Id. at 808–09.
88. See supra notes 3–8.
89. Walker, supra note 14, at 1147–48 (“Because it is easier, as an evidentiary matter,
to obtain a preliminary injunction, courts should conduct a more searching inquiry into the
appropriate scope of such an order.”).
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the issue of nonparties being affected by the preliminary injunction, a
concern that runs parallel to those raised by third-party standing, and
it prevents district court judges from interfering with the development
of law in other circuits.90
A. Distinction between Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions
The issue that arises with nationwide preliminary injunctions is
grounded in the fact that the injunctions are preliminary. While it
may be true that nationwide injunctions are necessary in certain
situations, those situations should be limited to instances of
permanent injunctions.91 To understand why the type of injunction
impacts the scope, it is important to understand the difference
between a preliminary and permanent injunction. Despite what some
discussion in case law might suggest,92 there is a meaningful difference
between a preliminary and permanent injunction.
Preliminary and permanent injunctions “are distinct forms of
equitable relief that have different prerequisites and serve entirely
different purposes.”93 A preliminary injunction occurs prior to or
during trial, while a permanent injunction is granted after a hearing
on the merits.94 Due to the difference in procedural posture of the two
remedies, the standards for granting a preliminary injunction and for
granting a permanent injunction are slightly different.95 The key
difference between these two standards is that a preliminary
injunction only requires that the plaintiff is likely to win the case on

90. See infra Section II.B.
91. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 157–68.
93. Lermer Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
94. See Permanent Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014);
Preliminary Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 367 (A.E. Randall ed., 3d ed.
1920) (“The perpetual injunction is in effect a decree, and concludes a right. The
interlocutory injunction is merely provisional in its nature, and does not conclude a
right.”).
95. A preliminary injunction requires that the plaintiff “establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). There is,
however, currently a circuit split over how to apply these factors. See Weisshaar, supra
note 25, at 1014–15. The standard of permanent injunctions is similar in that the plaintiff
must show “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010).
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the merits, while a permanent injunction is to be granted after a party
has already won on the merits.96 This difference creates a lower
evidentiary standard for preliminary injunctions as compared to the
standard for permanent injunctions.97 The distinction is one that some
courts have noticed,98 and it is one that scholars have asserted is a
meaningful difference.99
Instances in which nationwide injunctions have been granted,
and in which courts have made arguments for a nationwide scope, are
typically permanent, not preliminary, injunctions.100 Considering the
robust decision-making process that occurs prior to the issuance of a
permanent injunction, a nationwide scope may be warranted. Because
a permanent injunction occurs after a full hearing on the merits, a
judge has found the challenged action to be unlawful, and therefore
the drastic remedy of an injunction may be appropriate because the
action, now confirmed to be illegal, needs to be stopped.101 Since the
trial on the merits occurs prior to the decision about the appropriate
remedy, a judge makes her decision about the remedy with complete
information.
However, in the case of a preliminary injunction, a judge has not
actually found the challenged action to be unlawful nor has she seen
96. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981) (noting the impropriety of
equating “likelihood of success” with “success”); see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell,
480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the
same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a
likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.”).
97. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755–56
(1986), overruled on other grounds, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); see also Walker, supra note 14, at 1147–48.
98. See, e.g., Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing the
injunctions in Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) and
Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1985) from the case at hand by noting that they were
preliminary).
99. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV.
687, 692 (1990) (“Preliminary relief is best considered as a separate issue, only distantly
related to the choice of remedy at final judgment.”); Walker, supra note 14, at 1147–48
(advocating for consideration of the type of injunction when determining the scope of the
injunction).
100. See generally Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (providing an example of an instance in which the Court issued a
permanent injunction with nationwide scope).
101. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Government-wide
injunctive relief for plaintiffs and all individuals similarly situated can be entirely
appropriate and it is ‘well-supported by precedent, as courts frequently enjoin
enforcement of regulations ultimately held to be invalid.’”) (quoting Sanjour v. EPA, 7 F.
Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1998)); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America, Inc. v.
Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (enjoining enforcement of Title X regulations
that the court found to be unlawful).
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the parties’ full evidence and arguments.102 She makes her decision on
less formal procedures and incomplete information prior to the
parties’ full opportunity to be heard.103 The information presented at
the preliminary injunction stage may include “sketchy motion papers
and affidavits” that rely on incomplete or unreliable information, and
the defendant may not have sufficient time to prepare and present a
defense.104 The combination of an incomplete presentation of the
parties’ cases and the speed at which the judge must decide the issue
makes it more likely for the court to make an error.105 For this reason,
any findings at the preliminary injunction stage are not binding at the
trial on the merits.106 This acknowledges that findings made during the
preliminary injunction phase of litigation are not fully informed
findings. The practice of making these findings on incomplete
information is accepted for preliminary injunctions due to their timesensitive nature.107
The distinction between preliminary and permanent injunctions
is highlighted in Harmon v. Thornburgh.108 In Harmon, the D.C.
Circuit modified a permanent injunction issued by the district court
that prevented the Department of Justice from conducting random
drug tests on its employees.109 When discussing the appropriate
102. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 111
(1991); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525,
525 (1978).
103. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 does require a hearing prior to granting a preliminary injunction. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 2941 (noting that temporaryrestraining order may proceed without hearing but preliminary injunction requires one).
However, the standard for a preliminary injunction requires a likelihood of success, not a
showing of success. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. This lower standard
normally results in a less robust presentation of the parties’ cases. See Consolidation Coal
Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1971) (“Whenever the extraordinary
writ of injunction is granted, it should be tailored to restrain no more than what is
reasonably required to accomplish its ends. Particularly is this so when preliminary relief,
on something less than a full record and full resolution of the facts, is granted.”).
104. LAYCOCK, supra note 102, at 111.
105. Id.; see also ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1986)
(noting how preliminary injunctions put judges in “the awkward position of having to
make a judgment, with potentially serious consequences for the litigants and perhaps
others as well, on an incomplete, because hastily compiled, record”); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 760 (8th ed. 2011) (“Because the judge is being
asked to rule in a hurry, on the basis of incomplete information, the risk of error is
great.”).
106. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395; see also Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co.,
309 U.S. 310, 316 (1940).
107. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395.
108. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
109. Id. at 485, 493.
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remedy, the court noted that “[w]hen a reviewing court determines
that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the
rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual
petitioners is proscribed.”110 Therefore the rule is vacated with regard
to everyone, not just the named plaintiffs. However, this only occurs
once a court determines the agency regulation to be unlawful after a
full trial on the merits, as the district court held in Harmon.111 The
district court’s decision was made based on complete information
after the parties had a full opportunity to present their evidence and
be heard.112 Yet courts frequently cite this case as support of
nationwide preliminary injunctions113 in instances which the parties
have not had a full trial on the merits. The rule articulated in Harmon
should not be applied to a preliminary injunction because the
reviewing court has not yet found the agency regulation to be
unlawful. It has simply found that the party is likely to succeed on the
merits, a lower standard and one based on less information than the
permanent injunction standard.
Despite the distinction between preliminary and permanent
injunctions, courts frequently and interchangeably cite to cases
involving preliminary injunctions and cases involving permanent
injunctions, like Harmon, to support a nationwide preliminary
injunction.114 In some instances, a court will solely cite cases involving
permanent injunctions to justify a nationwide preliminary injunction.
For example, in the appeal of Texas I, the Fifth Circuit opinion cites
several cases as support for its affirmance of the district court’s
nationwide preliminary injunction, but all of the cited cases involve
permanent injunctions.115 It may be true that “[i]t is not beyond the
110. Id. at 495 n.21 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 493.
112. See id. at 487.
113. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d. 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016); Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June
27, 2016).
114. See, e.g., Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1501–02 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (involving a preliminary
injunction); Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving the use of
a permanent injunction to justify the scope of the permanent injunction in the instant
case)); see also Perez, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46. Perez cites: Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S.
682, 702 (1979) (analyzing propriety of nationwide class); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d
134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (involving a preliminary injunction); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1407–09 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (involving a permanent
injunction); and Harmon, 878 F.2d at 495 n.21 (involving a permanent injunction).
115. 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d
687, 699 (9th Cir. 2006) (issuing permanent injunction); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Grps. Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 705–06 (5th Cir. 1981) (issuing permanent
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power of a court, in appropriate circumstances, to issue a nationwide
injunction.”116 However, courts should take greater care to
understand the distinctions between preliminary and permanent
injunctions when considering a nationwide scope.
B.

Nonparty Concerns

When preliminary injunctions are nationwide in scope, not only
is the decision to grant the injunction based on incomplete
information, but the decision can also affect those across the nation
who are uninvolved in the litigation. While the uninvolved parties are
not technically bound by the preliminary injunction,117 they are
nevertheless affected by it. Specifically, they are likely people who
benefited from a federal rule or regulation that was subsequently
enjoined by a preliminary injunction, like employees who would have
been entitled to overtime wages had the Department of Labor’s new
overtime rule not been enjoined.118 These parties effectively have
their rights adjudicated without any opportunity to participate in the
adjudication,119 despite the fact that a court “may not attempt to
determine the rights of persons not before the court.”120
The concerns of nonparties being affected by nationwide
preliminary injunctions without participating in the litigation parallel
the concerns that arise with third party standing, which governs
whether a party indirectly affected by litigation has standing due to its
closely aligned interests with one of the parties. The prohibition on
third party standing is a prudential limitation, which means a principle
that “embodies ‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.’”121 Prudential limitations ensure that courts are
not “called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public

injunction); Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 449–50 (5th Cir.1973) (issuing
permanent injunction); Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 455 F.2d 818, 826 (5th
Cir. 1972) (issuing permanent injunction)).
116. 809 F.3d at 188 (emphasis added).
117. The federal government is the only party that is specifically enjoined.
118. See Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 525 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
While parties may also be harmed by the enjoined rule or regulation, and therefore
benefit from the injunction, this Comment is primarily concerned with the parties who are
negatively affected by the practice of nationwide injunctions.
119. See Morley, supra note 14, at 529.
120. Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Singleton v. Wuff, 428
U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (“Federal courts must hesitate before resolving a controversy, even
one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons
not parties to the litigation.”).
121. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (quoting Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
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significance even though other governmental institutions may be
more competent to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”122
Specifically with regard to third party standing, courts are generally
hesitant to “resolv[e] a controversy, even one within their
constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third
persons not parties to the litigation.”123 The Supreme Court has given
two reasons for this hesitance: “courts should not adjudicate [third
party] rights unnecessarily,” and “third parties themselves usually will
be the best proponents of their own rights.”124 However, third party
standing may be permissible when the “underlying justifications” for
the prudential limitation do not exist.125
There are many similarities between third party standing and
nationwide preliminary injunctions. Both are discretionary.126 Both
doctrines involve considering the interests of parties not before the
court,127 and they both require courts to exercise restraint,128
especially when presented with a constitutional issue.129 These
similarities are meaningful considering the ill-fated future of third
party standing and other prudential limitations on standing.130 Given
the fact that the concerns articulated about prudential standing and
potential impropriety of third party standing can be translated to
nationwide preliminary injunctions, a move away from third party

122. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
123. Singleton v. Wulff, 426 U.S. 106, 113 (1976).
124. Id. at 113–14.
125. See id. at 114.
126. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (“[D]istrict courts enjoy broad discretion in awarding injunctive relief.”); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1321, 1359–60 (2000).
127. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1409; Fallon, supra note 126, at 1359–60.
128. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 27 (2008); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
129. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 732 n.2 (1990); Converse Const. Co.
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 899 F. Supp. 753, 767 (D. Mass. 1995).
130. In Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377
(2014), the Supreme Court recently suggested that the end of prudential standing is near.
See id. at 1387 n.3; 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD
MURPHY, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8413 (3d. ed. Supp. 2017) (discussing
Lexmark)). Lexmark purports to not address third party standing, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3,
but scholars have hypothesized that this case represents a shift away from the use of
prudential standing. See Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in
Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 28 n.131 (2016) (noting that Lexmark “cast[s]
doubt on the framing of . . . prohibitions on third-party standing”); Ernest A. Young,
Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 152–53 (2014).
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standing suggests a similar need to move away from nationwide
preliminary injunctions.
When considering the similarities between third party standing
and nationwide preliminary injunctions, it is worth noting that the two
doctrines do not perfectly align. In third party standing cases, the
plaintiff brings a suit in order to represent the rights of someone not
party to the suit,131 and “the enjoyment of the right [asserted by the
litigant on behalf of the third party]” has to be “inextricably bound up
with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue.”132 For example, in
Singleton v. Wulff,133 physicians brought suit challenging a Missouri
state law that excluded abortions from Medicaid eligibility.134 The
Supreme Court allowed the physicians to bring suit on behalf of their
patients seeking abortions because even though the physicians were
not the parties seeking to have abortions covered by Medicaid, the
physicians are necessary for the patients to obtain the abortions;
therefore, their interests were sufficiently close.135 In addition, these
types of suits generally challenge government action on behalf of
parties who are harmed by the action.136 With nationwide preliminary
injunctions, the concern is for nonparties to the suit whose interests
do not align with the plaintiffs’ because they actually benefit from the
government action. Nationwide preliminary injunctions do not
implicate third party standing in a direct sense, as the plaintiffs are
not bringing suit on behalf of the people who benefit from the
challenged regulation.
Furthermore, a party affected by a nationwide preliminary
injunction may not have an issue with or actually benefit from the
enjoined practice. Nonparties to a lawsuit often purposely do not
assert their rights because they can exercise their rights regardless of
the outcome of litigation, or they simply do not want to assert them.137
For example, Jose Lopez and Martín Jonathan Batalla Vidal both
benefited from the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(“DACA”) program as it allowed them to obtain employment

131. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1991).
132. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976).
133. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
134. Id. at 108.
135. Id. at 117.
136. See, e.g., id. at 108 (finding that physicians have standing to assert the rights of
their patients while challenging a state statute).
137. See id. at 113–14.
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authorization.138 However, their right to obtain their employment
authorization was adjudicated before a Texas court without an
opportunity to be heard.139 The nationwide preliminary injunction
enjoining the implementation of the DACA program turned Lopez,
Vidal, and many others who were not parties before the court into
“members of an implied class, despite the fact that they have not been
brought before the court, been notified about the case, or consented
to such representation.”140 With nationwide preliminary injunctions,
nonparties who may have an important stake in the litigation simply
do not matter and are not taken into consideration.141
Beyond the comparison to third party standing, an important
distinction to make when discussing the rights of nonparties is that the
parties are being affected by the injunction, but they are not
technically bound by the injunction because they are not parties to
the litigation.142 Instead, they are affected by the ruling through the
party who is enjoined from acting.143 Rule 65(d)(2) states that the
preliminary injunction binds the parties and any party that acts in
concert with the bound parties.144 It is inaccurate to use Rule 65 as
support for the consideration of nonparties because the rule only
discusses who is bound, or forced to refrain from acting by the
injunction.145 The Ninth Circuit adopted this misguided viewpoint in
Zepeda v. INS,146 quoting Rule 65 and then noting “[t]he district court
must, therefore, tailor the injunction to affect only those persons over
which it has power.”147 In his dissent, Judge Norris took issue with this
interpretation. He noted that Rule 65 “only provides that an
injunction may not bind non-parties,” and it “does not address the
question whether an injunction may benefit non-parties.”148 This
distinction is a logical one, and it is important to note that using this

138. See Complaint at 2, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12,
2016); Amended Complaint at 2, Make the Road N.Y. v. Baran, No. 1:16-cv-04756
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016).
139. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
140. Morley, supra note 14, at 527–28.
141. See Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to
Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 648 (2015) (“[N]either the ability of the plaintiff to assert
the claim nor the scope of the prospective injunctive relief will depend on whether any
other similarly situated plaintiffs consent to the action or join in seeking similar relief.”).
142. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
143. See, e.g., Texas I, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
145. Id.
146. 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983).
147. Id. at 727.
148. Id. at 733 (Norris, J., dissenting).
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Rule 65 line of reasoning is not particularly useful in justifying
concerns for the rights of nonparties in nationwide preliminary
injunctions. Judge Norris further noted “[t]he question before us for
decision is not whether the injunction is overly broad because it may
benefit persons other than the plaintiffs; the question is whether the
injunction is broader in scope than reasonably necessary to protect
the rights of the individual plaintiffs.”149 While his refocusing of the
issue places emphasis on the predominant question of determining
the scope of a preliminary injunction, the effect on nonparties should
not be ignored. Judge Norris’s framing of the effect makes the effect
appear to be harmless because his discussion only mentions benefits
that can be obtained from the injunction.150 Focusing on a beneficial
effect aligns with justifications for third party standing.151 But he did
not consider effects that place a burden on nonparties, which is
arguably more important than benefits because it harms the
nonparties.
Courts may consider nonparty interests when issuing nationwide
preliminary injunctions, but the consideration likely takes place only
during the decision as to whether an injunction should be granted, not
during the determination of the scope of the injunction. One of the
factors to be used in considering the appropriateness of a preliminary
injunction is whether the injunction “is in the public interest.”152
Because injunctions are an “extraordinary remedy,” precedent has
cautioned that “courts of equity should pay particular regard for the
public consequences in employing . . . [an] injunction.”153 When
analyzing this factor, courts weigh the harm of the practice that is the
focus of the injunction (i.e., the rule or regulation) with the harm that
could result from the preliminary injunction.154 For example, in
Nevada v. U.S. Department of Labor,155 the district court weighed the
harm to the public that could result from enjoining the overtime
rule.156 The plaintiffs pointed to the potential for harm to the public if
the rule was not enjoined, including layoffs, increased state budgets,

149. Id.
150. See id.
151. 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3 (3d. ed. 2017).
152. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
153. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
154. See, e.g., Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 533 (E.D. Tex.
2016).
155. 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
156. Id. at 533.
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and interference with government operations.157 The defendants
identified the harm that the rule sought to fix, the denial of overtime
pay to workers.158 These workers are the affected nonparties with
whom this Comment is concerned. The district court found that an
injunction would best serve the public interest, relying on the idea
that a preliminary injunction is meant to preserve the status quo, and
“if the [overtime rule] is valid, then an injunction will only delay the
regulation’s implementation.”159 This reasoning is logical for
determining whether or not an injunction is warranted. However,
recognizing that harm may occur to parties affected by the
preliminary injunction, like the workers who would be denied
additional pay, should be taken into account when defining the scope
of the preliminary injunction. A more narrowing principle to limit the
harm should be encouraged.
There are instances in which a court can properly exercise its
power that affects parties who are not before it. In National Mining
Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,160 the D.C. Circuit
affirmed the district court’s invalidation of a U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers regulation and the district court’s implementation of a
nationwide permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the
regulation.161 In discussing the scope of the injunction, the court
explained that when “[an agency] rule is invalidated, . . . a single
plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the rule, may obtain
‘programmatic’ relief that affects the rights of parties not before the
court.”162 This makes sense. If a court finds an agency rule to be
unlawful, the rule should not be applied to anyone, not just solely the
party who challenged it in court. But again, this relates back to the
point that this ruling applies to parties who are not before the court
after a full hearing on the merits in which the rule was found to be
unlawful.163
An additional issue that arises with nonparties being affected by
nationwide preliminary injunctions occurs when the nonparties are
involved in litigating the same issue in another district or another
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
161. Id. at 1401.
162. Id. at 1409 (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 913 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). The court also noted that Justice Blackmun wrote “in dissent
but apparently express[ed] the view of all nine Justices” on this topic. Id. at 1409 (citing
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890 n.2 (majority opinion)).
163. See supra Section II.A.
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circuit, creating confusion as to which court’s ruling the nonparty is
bound by. The tension between Texas v. United States (Texas II)164
and Carcaño v. McCrory165 is illustrative of this issue. Both cases
involved the Department of Education’s guidance regarding its
interpretation of the word “sex” to include gender identity in Title
IX.166 In Texas II, the federal district court judge in the Northern
District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that
enjoined the federal government from enforcing its interpretation of
“sex.”167 Days later, a federal district judge in the Middle District of
North Carolina granted a limited preliminary injunction to the named
plaintiffs that had the opposite effect.168 The Carcaño preliminary
injunction allowed agencies to follow the Department of Education
guidance with respect to the named plaintiffs,169 relying on Fourth
Circuit precedent. The judge acknowledged the nationwide
preliminary injunction by the Texas judge, but he essentially ignored
it for jurisdictional purposes.170 This results begs the question—is the
Texas judge’s nationwide preliminary injunction truly nationwide if a
district court judge in another circuit can simply ignore it?
Courts attempt to address these nonparty concerns and
frequently cite Califano v. Yamasaki171 as support for creating
nationwide preliminary injunctions;172 however, reliance on this case
for nationwide preliminary injunctions without a class action is
improper. Califano primarily deals with certifying a nationwide
class,173 so the nonparty concerns are addressed by the class
certification process.174 A frequently cited phrase from Califano is

164. 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
165. 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
166. Id. at 636; Texas II, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 815–16.
167. Texas II, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 836.
168. See Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d. at 653. Interestingly, the preliminary injunction in
Carcaño applied only to the named plaintiffs because “the current complaint asserts no
claim for class relief.” Id.
169. See id. at 636, 653 (citing G.G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.
2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.).
170. Carcaño, 203 F. Supp. 3d. at 635 n.22 (“Because Texas is a district court opinion
from outside the Fourth Circuit, however, and because the court’s order was issued after
the initiation of this case, this court remains bound by G.G. and the Texas order has no
direct effect on this litigation.”).
171. 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
172. See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017);
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565 (D. Md. 2017);
Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 533 (E.D. Tex. 2016); Texas II, 201 F.
Supp. 3d at 836; Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
173. Califano, 442 U.S. at 684.
174. Id. at 701.
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“the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation
established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.”175 A
complete reading is required to prevent a skewed perspective of this
rule: “Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of equity
jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the
extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of
the plaintiff class.”176 The premise of this rule about the scope of
injunctive relief is supported by the underlying requirement of a
nationwide class. The paragraph in which this rule is discussed in
context of a class action and relates to the geographical scope of a
plaintiff class.177 Moreover, the following sentence supports the
precondition of a class certification when applying this rule:
[i]f a class action is otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over
the claims of the members of the class, the fact that the class is
nationwide in scope does not necessarily mean that the relief
afforded the plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary
to redress the complaining parties.178
Courts have also claimed authority to grant nationwide
preliminary injunctions179 using language in Califano that says
“[a]bsent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress,
federal courts retain their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits
over which they have jurisdiction.”180 The court does not specify what
type of jurisdiction it is referring to in the Califano opinion; however,
the cases it cites to support its proposition involve equity
jurisdiction.181 Equity jurisdiction
does not refer to jurisdiction in the sense of the power
conferred by the sovereign on the court over specified subjectmatters or to jurisdiction over the res or the persons of the
parties in a particular proceeding but refers rather to the merits.
The want of equity jurisdiction does not mean that the court

175. Id. at 702; see, e.g., Nevada, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 533–34; Texas II, 201 F. Supp. 3d at
836.
176. Califano, 442 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. See, e.g., Nevada, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 533–34; Texas II, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 835–36.
180. Califano, 442 U.S. at 705 (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398
(1946); Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9–11 (1942)).
181. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (“Such a jurisdiction is
an equitable one. Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers
of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that
jurisdiction.”).
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has no power to act but that it should not act, as on the ground,
for example, that there is an adequate remedy at law.182
Therefore, the Califano opinion simply reiterates that the court
has the equitable power to issue injunctions. This was a concern in the
case because the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare made a statutory argument that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief given the limited jurisdiction
provided by the Social Security Act.183 The Court noted that
“[n]othing in either the language or the legislative history of [the
Social Security Act] indicates that Congress intended to preclude
injunctive relief in § 205(g) suits.”184 Therefore this rule does not
stand for the proposition that district courts have the power to issue
nationwide preliminary injunctions. Rather, it simply stands for the
fact that courts retain their ability to grant injunctive relief unless
Congress explicitly limits them from doing so.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The unappealing nature of nationwide preliminary injunctions
and the lack of guidance in determining the scope of preliminary
injunctions can leave courts with a conundrum as to what to do when
a party requests a preliminary injunction against the federal
government. Some scholars have proposed creating a requirement
that nationwide preliminary injunctions should only be issued when
they are necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.185
Others have suggested practical solutions such as adopting different
standards of review, treating declaratory judgments as legal, and no
longer allowing the plaintiff to draft the injunction.186
While these proposed solutions are meaningful and could prove
to be effective, they do not directly address the nonparty concerns
raised in this Comment. They aim to restrict the power of a federal
district court judge and limit the scope of the injunction, but they still
allow for the possibility of parties not before the court to be affected
182. DE FUNIAK, supra note 39, at 38.
183. See Califano, 442 U.S. at 704–05 (discussing section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act, which provides: “The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012)).
184. Id. at 705.
185. Siddique, supra note 14 (manuscript at 40–41). However, Siddique does
acknowledge the difficulty of creating a standard that determines what “complete relief”
entails. Id. at 43.
186. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 19, 61).
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by the preliminary injunction. However, several proposed reforms do
address those concerns. One such reform includes the creation of a
system of notice for parties who may be affected by a nationwide
injunction.187 This type of system would allow parties who would be
affected by a nationwide preliminary injunction to have an
opportunity to become involved in the action, giving them the chance
to represent their interests. Yet depending on the case, it may be
impractical to provide notice to every potential party who may be
affected by an injunction. For example, it would be difficult to
provide notice and opportunity to intervene to every person in the
United States who is no longer entitled to overtime wages as a result
of the Department of Labor Rule being enjoined in Nevada v. U.S.
Department of Labor.
Another potential reform advocates for a rule requiring an
injunction that enjoins the enforcement of a federal law or regulation
to be narrowly tailored to only apply to the plaintiffs.188 Again, this
would prevent nonparties to the lawsuit from being affected by the
preliminary injunction. A frequent criticism of this solution is that
parties who were uninvolved in the narrowly tailored preliminary
injunction would bring duplicative suits in order to also obtain a
preliminary injunction, opening a “floodgate” of litigation.189 This
concern is understandable, especially in the D.C. Circuit, where a
great amount of challenges to federal agency action takes place.190
However, when considering the purpose of a preliminary injunction,
the actual likelihood of duplicative litigation seems low. Preliminary
injunctions are meant to be temporary until a trial on the merits is
held. If the plaintiff succeeds after a full trial on the merits, then a
court can grant a permanent injunction that applies nationwide,
preventing duplicative litigation. Any nonparties would be covered by
the permanent injunction.191 They may be left without relief in the
interim while the issue is being litigated, but knowing that the matter
is in the process of being resolved in the near future is reassurance
that they do not need to go through the hassle of litigation. Moreover,
scholars have noted that in practice “[c]ourts do not generally get

187. Thank you to Zayn Siddique for this idea.
188. Bray, supra note 14 (manuscript at 51).
189. See Laura W. Stein, The Court and the Community: Why Non-Party Interests
Should Count in Preliminary Injunctions, 16 REV. LITIG. 27, 62 (1997); Walker, supra note
14, at 1148–49.
190. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409–10 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
191. See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 494–95 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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bogged down dealing with a multiplicity of interests in preliminary
injunction cases.”192
An additional solution—requiring plaintiffs to re-file the case as
a class action if a court determines that a nationwide injunction is
unavoidable—would ensure all parties with a stake in the litigation
have the opportunity to represent their interests.193 This solution
provides the procedural safeguards of the class certification process.
Class actions are a meaningful way to ensure the procedural
safeguards, such as notice and opportunity to be heard, are in place
prior to granting a nationwide preliminary injunction. This approach
was taken in National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS,194 in
which the defendants sought to reverse the grant of a preliminary
injunction to stop the implementation of a new INS regulation.195 The
district court granted the preliminary injunction without certifying a
class.196 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case, finding the scope of the
preliminary injunction to be too broad.197 The court held that “in the
absence of class certification, the preliminary injunction may properly
cover only the named plaintiffs.”198 Class action certification allows
the opportunity for nonparties to have an opportunity to assert their
rights before the court in the adjudication of the preliminary
injunction.199 When no class action exists, courts should tend to be
more cautious in granting nationwide preliminary injunctions.200 In
addition, limiting the class to the region of appellate jurisdiction
would create further assurance that a federal district court would not
intrude on the precedent or judicial independence of other circuits.201
192. Stein, supra note 189, at 62.
193. See Morley, supra note 14, 553–54. But see Slack, supra note 20, at 946 (advocating
for “a narrowly-focused and rebuttable presumption against nationwide class certification
in actions against the federal government.”). However, most of the reasoning in
Separation of Powers and Second Opinions applies to the argument against nationwide
preliminary injunctions. See id. at 995 (discussing the importance of developing the law
through different lower court decisions).
194. 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 481 U.S. 1009 (1987).
195. Id. at 1367.
196. Id. at 1371.
197. Id. at 1371–72.
198. Id. at 1371.
199. But see Williams, supra note 141, at 651 (“Nothing in Rule 23(b)(2) [of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] requires that all members of an injunctive class agree
with the litigation’s goals, and courts and commentators generally agree that ‘[a]ll the class
members need not be aggrieved by or desire to challenge the defendant’s conduct in order
for some of them to seek relief under Rule 23(b)(2).’”)
200. See, e.g., L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 2011)
(asserting that the rule in Califano mandating properly tailored relief “applies with special
force where there is no class certification.”).
201. Morley, supra note 14, at 555.
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This would limit issues such as the one that arose with the
contradictory results in Texas II and Carcaño v. McCrory.202
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to think of a remedy more “extraordinary and
drastic”203 than a nationwide preliminary injunction granted by a
federal district court judge, whose jurisdiction is usually limited to one
state or a district within one state. This type of injunctive relief
spreads beyond the borders of the judge’s territorial jurisdiction and
encroaches on people who live thousands of miles from the judge in
significant and meaningful ways. This practice is concerning given the
incomplete information used to grant preliminary injunctions and the
potential for a substantial effect on nonparty interests. Given these
concerns, this Comment suggests that there should be a presumption
against nationwide preliminary injunctions. Should there be a
sufficient showing that a nationwide preliminary injunction is
unavoidable, this Comment recommends the requirement of
additional procedural safeguards, such as a notice system or class
certification, to alleviate the nonparty concerns that arise with this
practice.
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